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  Abstract 
This paper discusses alternative transition strategies of moving towards an S-base cash-flow 
business tax. While the tax has attractive neutrality properties, moving from the current 
situation towards the new system often involves a stark trade-off between short-run losses 
and long-run gains. We evaluate several alternative transition strategies. The preferred 
strategy consists of instantaneous implementation, an 80% devaluation of historical tax 
depreciation claims, and transitory deficit financing for intertemporal tax smoothing. This 
policy prevents windfall gains or losses on old capital, avoids a negative impact on labor 
market performance and thereby prevents short-run income losses. Simulations with a 
calibrated model for Germany indicate that this transition policy induces strong investment 
driven growth and yields a 7% gain in GDP per capita and a reduction in the unemployment 
rate by 1.5 percentage points in the long-run. 
 
JEL-Classification 
H21, H25, H32, J64. 
 
Keywords 
Cash-flow tax, investment, unemployment, transition policy. 
 1 Introduction
In most countries, the system of company taxation has historically evolved in a way that slows
down growth and interferes with an eﬃcient allocation of capital. Business taxation distorts
on multiple behavioral margins (see Auerbach, 2002, for a review). The tax system typically
discourages investment and capital accumulation (Hasset and Hubbard, 2002), favors debt over
equity ﬁnancing (Miller, 1977, and Graham, 2003), favors proﬁt retentions and reduces payouts
(Poterba, 2004, and Chetty and Saez, 2005), discourages foreign direct investment and leads to
proﬁt shifting in high tax countries (see OECD, 2007, for a review), can distort the choice of legal
form (MacKie-Mason and Gordon, 1997), and often discourages new ﬁrm creation (see Cullen
and Gordon, 2002). Presumably the most important distortions with the largest detrimental
eﬀect on economic performance are the impact on investment and capital structure choice. The
distorting eﬀects of taxes on these margins are summarized by the measurement of marginal
and average eﬀective tax rates (King and Fullerton, 1984, and Sorensen, 2004).
A large literature focusses on the design of a more neutral tax system that could yield
important eﬃciency gains by eliminating distortions both in the level and allocation of capital.
Sinn (1987) discusses a range of alternative tax systems, analyzes their neutrality properties and
derives the eﬀects on investment based growth. The Meade Report (1978) developed various
designs of consumption-based tax systems with cash-ﬂow taxation of proﬁts. A cash-ﬂow tax
is part of the ﬂat-tax proposal of Hall and Rabushka (1995) and was recently recommended
by the US President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2006). Mitschke (2004) opted
for a variant (S-base) of a cash-ﬂow tax as part of a comprehensive tax reform proposal for
Germany. The present paper studies the transitional and long-run consequences of introducing
an S-base cash-ﬂow tax. The main advantages of the tax are its neutrality properties with
respect to investment and ﬁnancial choices which could lead to substantial income gains when it
replaces the distorting aspects of the current system. The main alternative concept is the ACE
system with an allowance for corporate equity which goes back to Boadway and Bruce (1984)
and was introduced in the tax reform debate by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991). Bond
and Devereux (1995) argue that ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes are, in fact, equivalent. In the UK,
the background studies for the Mirrlees Report (2009) seem to favor an ACE system.
A considerable literature discusses the potential beneﬁts and costs of moving towards a
1consumption based tax system of which a cash-ﬂow corporate tax is part of it (see Auerbach,
2008, for a primer, as well as Bradford, 2005, Gordon et al. 2004, and references therein).
Part of this work uses simulation models to assess eﬃciency and distributional consequences of
moving from the income to variants of a consumption tax (Auerbach, Kotlikoﬀ and Skinner,
1983; Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ, 1987; Auerbach, 1996; Altig et al., 2001; Keuschnigg, 1991;
Keuschnigg and Dietz, 2007; Radulescu and Stimmelmayr, 2007, Sarkar and Zodrow, 1993; and
Zodrow, 2002). Bradford (1996) and Kaplow (2008) discuss fundamental conceptual problems
related to the transition issues. Kaplow particularly focusses on the role of capital levies and the
treatment of windfall gains and losses at the date of reform. In essence, this literature points to
an important conﬂict between the long-run gains and short-run losses of a growth oriented tax
reform and shows that transition relief to protect present generations often reduces the long-run
growth eﬀects quite substantially.
The present paper speciﬁcally discusses the consequences of moving to an S-base cash-ﬂow
tax in Germany. Such a system was recently suggested by Mitschke (2004). Using balance sheet
and income tax data, Becker and Fuest (2005) found that the revenue losses might actually be
quite moderate and conclude that the current tax system collects little revenue from actually
taxing the normal return to capital. Their analysis follows the methodology of Gordon and
Slemrod (1988) who argued that the US might have actually gained revenue by moving to a
consumption tax while their update in Gordon, Kalambokidis, Rohaly and Slemrod (2004) for
the years 1995 and 2004 yields considerable losses in tax revenue. These empirical studies,
however, do not take into account any behavioral response of tax reform. Fuest et al. (2006) use
a microsimulation model and found rather moderate long-run eﬀects of implementing the entire
income tax proposal due to Mitschke (2004) which includes also a general income tax reform
apart from moving to an S-base cash-ﬂow tax. Their model is less useful in computing growth
eﬀects from induced capital accumulation and dynamic gains of tax reform since it doesn’t
take account of transitional issues. The analysis of alternative transition strategies and their
trade-oﬀs between short- and long-run growth is the main contribution of this paper.
This paper studies the short- and long-run consequences of moving to an S-base cash-ﬂow
tax in Germany and uses a detailed computational growth model of an open economy with over-
lapping generations. A particularly novel feature is the existence of equilibrium unemployment
2which introduces a new transmission channel of gains and costs of capital income tax reform.
The incidence of the corporate income tax is, thus, not only on the wealth of present generations
and wage earnings of present and future workers, but is also felt in terms of signiﬁcant eﬀects
on involuntary unemployment (see Keuschnigg, 2009, for analytical results). The paper thus
yields new insights on capital income tax reform in an advanced welfare state with high unem-
ployment which seems particularly important for Germany. Apart from intertemporal savings
and investment behavior as drivers of growth and wealth creation, the model also endogenizes
capital structure choice. This will reveal the quantitative implications of eliminating the tax
distortion in favor of debt ﬁnancing. It will also identify an important transitional problem of
moving to an S-base system that is neglected in many if not most of the quantitative studies.
The tax reform leads ﬁrms to reduce the debt asset ratio. Since capital accumulation and, thus,
total assets can change only slowly, ﬁrms achieve a lower debt asset ratio in the short-run by
repaying a large amount of debt and issuing new equity instead. In an S-base system, new
debt is added to taxable proﬁt but repayment of debt reduces the tax base, leading to losses of
corporate tax revenue in the short-run. These losses signiﬁcantly add to the transition costs.
This and other transition problems are an illustration of Feldstein’s (1976) argument that an
attractive ‘de novo’ design of a tax system might not be as attractive anymore if the diﬃculties
of moving from initial conditions to the new system and the need for compensating potential
losers is appropriately taken account of.
A careful discussion of problems related to transition is important for several reasons. Apart
from important legal aspects related to the implementation, the political acceptance of funda-
mental tax reform is certainly bigger if the reform yields positive eﬀects in the short-run as well.
Further, a large part of the long-run gains might merely reﬂect redistribution towards future
generations rather than pure eﬃciency gains. Our discussion of transition strategies emphasizes
three crucial elements: (i) Speed of reform, i.e. gradual versus instantaneous implementation of
the system; (ii) Treatment of windfall gains or losses on old capital at the date of reform which
fundamentally aﬀects the distribution between owners of old capital and present and future
workers; (iii) The use of debt policy to smooth tax rates and to distribute transition costs more
evenly between present and future generations. After evaluating a number of alternatives, our
most favored transition policy is characterized by the following elements: (i) Instantaneous im-
3plementation of the S-base system without delay; (ii) Devaluation of historical tax depreciation
allowances by about 80% and writing oﬀ the remaining 20% of the stock in the early transition
phase. This measure implies that current owners of the capital stock experience neither wind-
fall gains nor losses and are exactly compensated;1 (iii) Using public debt to perfectly smooth
wage tax rates over time where the level of these tax rates is chosen to satisfy the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint.
When keeping capital income tax rates constant, we ﬁnd that the once and for all change
in the wage tax is almost zero, i.e. the reform can be implemented with no signiﬁcant change
in the wage tax burden. Using deﬁcit ﬁnance in the short-run to smooth tax rates over time
accumulates public debt of 94% of GDP in the long-run, up from today’s level of 67%. The
transition policy thus prevents an increase in labor taxes (or other distorting taxes) and thereby
avoids a negative impact on short-run labor market performance. There is no instantaneous
decline in GDP, no increase in unemployment and no windfall loss on household sector ﬁnancial
wealth. Yet the strong investment incentives of the S-base cash-ﬂow tax are immediately eﬀective
to start capital accumulation. Once the associated productivity gains materialize, wages rise,
unemployment declines and GDP strongly grows not only because of capital accumulation,
but also because of higher employment. When the economy approaches the new stationary
equilibrium, the unemployment rate is down by 1.5 percentage points, wages are 3.4% higher,
employment expands by 2.3% and GDP grows by 7% in the long-run, compared to what it
would be with balanced growth in the absence of tax reform. With the S-base system, corporate
tax revenue is 13% lower but the loss in tax revenue and the larger interest cost of servicing
the higher level of public debt are fully compensated by the growth induced revenue gains from
other taxes, and from the savings in social spending due to lower unemployment.
In the following, Section 2 ﬁrst derives some stylized analytical results and then discusses
the more elaborate structure and the calibration of the simulation model. Section 3 reports
simulation results. Section 4 summarizes the main insights.
1In isolating eﬃciency gains of tax reform from redistribution in an overlapping generations model with old
and young agents, Keuschnigg (1994, p. 351-2) deﬁnes intergenerational neutrality of tax changes by the absence
of income eﬀects across generations. Part of this deﬁnition is the absence of windfall gains or losses imposed on
the ﬁrst old generation. This result intuitively rationalizes the design of our preferred transition strategy.
42 Transition to a Cash-Flow Tax
2.1 Long-Run Impact
We design a quantitative model to analyze the short- and long-run eﬀects of moving to a cash-
ﬂow tax in Germany. The model includes several taxes at the ﬁrm and investor level, allows for
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the tax base and can, thus, simulate the transition to widely discussed
alternative tax systems such as variants of a cash-ﬂow tax, a CBIT business tax or an ACE
system (allowance for corporate equity). This paper focusses on moving towards an S-base
cash-ﬂow tax, as was recently suggested for Germany by Mitschke (2004) and analyzed by
Becker and Fuest (2005). We present here only those parts of the model which are necessary
to derive the main long-run implications of the reform and illustrate the diﬃculties confronted
when moving from the status quo to full implementation of the reform. The Appendix derives
optimal investment and capital structure choice of ﬁrms and shortly introduces the details of
capital income taxation at the personal level.2
Value maximization leads ﬁrms to invest and issue new debt and equity and thereby accu-
mulate stocks of debt B and total assets K according to
(a) Kt+1 = It + (1 − δ)Kt,





1 − ˜ δ
￿
˜ Kt,
(c) Bt+1 = BN
t + Bt,
(1)
where BN is new debt issues, I gross investment and δ the economic depreciation rate. Impor-
tantly, ﬁrms also accumulate a tax depreciable capital stock ˜ K which is written oﬀ at a rate ˜ δ.
While a part ǫII of investment is immediately expensed, the remaining part is added to the tax
depreciable capital stock and written oﬀ over the remaining life-time of the asset. The generosity
of tax depreciation is reﬂected in ǫI and ˜ δ.
Net investment adds to capacity and determines earnings ˜ Y = F
￿
K,LD￿
− J (I,K) − WD
where F is a standard production function and LD and WD are employment and the wage bill.3
2The reader is referred to Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2009) for a complete model documentation, including
frictional unemployment resulting from job search of households and job creation by ﬁrms.
3The separate Appendix (Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg, 2009) explains hiring subject to recruitement costs in
a search labor market.
5Further, installing I units of new equipment creates installation costs J, measured in terms of
foregone output. These costs are convex increasing in investment and declining in the capital
stock, and are normalized to zero when the investment to capital ratio is stationary. Subtracting
the cost of external debt, consisting of interest iB plus debt management costs m per unit of
capital, as well as economic depreciation and corporate tax yields ﬁrm proﬁts
π = ˜ Y − iBB − mK − δK − TK,
TK = tK
￿
˜ Y − ˜ δ ˜ K − ǫII − ǫB ￿
iBB + mK
￿




The cost of external debt not only includes interest paid to investors, but also ‘agency costs’ or
debt management costs m(b). Following much of the tax literature, we model them in reduced
form only. They are assumed convex in the ﬁrms’s debt asset ratio b = B/K. While some debt
might be useful to discipline management, too much debt can create bankruptcy costs. These
oﬀsetting forces are assumed to result in an optimal capital structure ¯ b such that agency costs
are minimized, i.e. m′ ≷ 0 ⇔ b ≷ ¯ b. For simplicity, m
￿¯ b
￿
is normalized to zero.
Apart from the corporate tax rate tK, the tax liability depends on the deﬁnition of the
tax base which is controlled by several ǫ-parameters. The tax base consists of earnings and is
reduced by normal and instantaneous tax depreciation, ˜ δ ˜ K and ǫII. Total assets K are split
into debt B and equity K − B. In most real world tax systems, the tax code further allows a
deduction of the cost of debt (ǫB = 1), consisting of interest spending and debt management
costs. If ǫN = 1, ﬁrms must add the proceeds from new debt issues to their taxable earnings and,
conversely, can subtract repayment of debt. Finally, some tax systems set ǫE = 1 and thereby
include an allowance for the cost of equity (ACE). In standard systems, and reﬂecting the status
quo in Germany, ǫB = 1 (full deduction of interest on debt), ǫN = 0 (no addition of new debt),
ǫE = 0 (no deduction of the interest cost of equity), ǫI = 0 (no immediate write-oﬀ, or at least
small), and ˜ δ   δ (faster tax depreciation). An S-Base Cash-ﬂow tax is characterized by
ǫI = ǫB = ǫN = 1 and ǫE = 0. Apart from immediate depreciation, new debt must be added to
the tax base while interest costs are deducted. No allowance for the cost of equity is possible.
Value maximization yields optimal decision rules of ﬁrms as in (A.4-A.5) of the Appendix.











iB + m′ (b)
￿
. (3)




. The market dictates rates of return on equity and debt equal to iE and
iB which depend on interest i∗ and personal taxes on interest, dividends and capital gains.
Firms raise their leverage and accept increasingly high agency costs m′ at the margin until the
cost of equity is equalized to the net cost of debt. A higher tax rate thus encourages higher
leverage since the cost of debt is tax deductible while the opportunity cost of equity is not. When
moving to an S-Base cash-ﬂow tax, the government deﬁnes the tax base by setting ǫI = 1,
ǫB = ǫN = 1 and ǫE = 0. The optimal use of debt is now governed by iE = iB + m′. In equally
treating the costs of debt and equity, an S-Base cash-ﬂow tax implies debt neutrality at the ﬁrm
level. If, in addition, interest, dividends and capital gains were all taxed in a non-discriminatory
way, with identical personal level tax rates tD = tG = tB, the tax system would be completely
neutral since iE = iB and m′ ￿¯ b
￿
= 0, just as in a world without taxes.
In a long-run, stationary equilibrium, the pretax return on capital equal to the user cost of
capital uK ≡ FK − δ, is given in (A.7) of the Appendix and can be written as
uK = (1 − b)   1−ǫEtK

















Z ≡ ǫItK +
￿






The present value of normal tax depreciation is z while Z is the eﬀective tax subsidy to the
purchase cost of new capital, including instantaneous depreciation. The impact of the tax
system on the cost of capital is in three parts. The ﬁrst two terms capture the impact on
the cost of equity and debt ﬁnancing which feed through to the user cost in proportion to
the equity and debt ratios, 1 − b and b, respectively. The third term captures a tax cost or
subsidy independent of the source of ﬁnance. In the status quo, accelerated tax depreciation
can be summarized by ǫI = 0 and ˜ δ > δ, and the tax base is deﬁned by ǫN = ǫE = 0 and
ǫB = 1. The user cost of capital thus emerges as uK = (1 − b) iE/
￿
1 − tK￿
+b iB +PI where
PI = m(b)−
￿





1−tK. To the extent that investment is equity ﬁnanced, the corporate
tax raises the user cost and discourages investment since the cost of equity is not tax deductible.
Firms have to earn a higher pre-tax return iE/
￿
1 − tK￿
to pay investors the required return iE
after ﬁrm level taxes. The tax, however, does not discourage debt ﬁnanced investment since the
cost of debt is deducted from the tax base. Finally, accelerated tax depreciation ˜ δ > δ results
7in a present value of tax savings that eﬀectively subsidize the cost of capital, leading to PI < 0.
On the other hand, if the tax system distorts ﬁnancing choices (b  = ¯ b), it leads to higher debt
management costs and, thereby, inﬂates the user cost by m > 0.4 In the absence of tax, agency
costs are zero since ﬁnancing choice is not distorted, leading to PI = 0. Without personal taxes,
iE = iB = i∗ = uK, giving the well known investment rule FK = i∗ + δ in an open economy.
When moving to an S-base cash-ﬂow tax, the investment subsidy is Z = tK due to
immediate expensing which leaves a subsidy PI = m − tKiE/
￿
1 − tK￿
to both equity and debt
ﬁnanced investment. The cost of capital thus emerges as uK = (1 − b)   iE + b   iB + m, i.e.
the corporate tax is neutral with respect to investment. If, in addition, personal level taxes are
non-discriminating, investment incentives are again summarized by FK = i∗ + δ.
2.2 Transition Strategies
To illustrate the main diﬃculty, one should ﬁrst note that allowing immediate investment ex-
pensing also implies that ﬁrms are denied any claims on normal tax depreciation. When the
government honors past promises, the tax base is still reduced by depreciation allowances ˜ δ ˜ K
at the date of reform since past claims are historically predetermined. These allowances dis-
appear over time since the existing tax depreciable capital stock is written oﬀ according to
˜ Kt+1 =
￿
1 − ˜ δ
￿
˜ Kt. Comparing the tax bases under the status quo and after implementation of
the S-base cash-ﬂow tax yields






− ˜ δ ˜ K
￿
,






− ˜ δ ˜ K − I + BN
￿
,
At the date of tax reform, the allowances ˜ δ ˜ K are still present in the full amount and disappear
only after an extended transitional period. All stocks and, largely also ˜ Y , are ﬁxed in the short-
run. The transitional problems are largest in the ﬁrst period of implementation when stocks are
predetermined. The tax base can shrink dramatically for two reasons. First, immediate invest-
ment expensing erodes the tax base by an additional amount I −BN which can be substantial.
Especially, in the ﬁrst periods investment will be particularly high to start the growth process.
4Deﬁning the average costs of ﬁnance as i
K = (1 − b)i
E + bi








K as reported in Figure 1 and Table 1 below.
8Given that the S-Base tax removes the debt preference under the status quo, ﬁrms might also
want to repay part of their debt and issue equity instead, making BN < 0, which further erodes
the tax base under the S-Base system in the early adjustment phase. Second, some tax reform
proposals (such as Mitschke, 2004, for Germany) argue that old equity capital K − B must be
compensated for the following reason: since immediate expensing reduces the acquisition price
of new capital from 1 to 1−tK, arbitrage dictates that the value of old capital would fall as well
but it never had the advantage of immediate expensing. If the government wanted to grant a
compensation to avoid ‘expropriation’ of old capital because it did not beneﬁt from immediate
expensing, one way to do so would be to raise ˜ K instantaneously by adding part of old equity
K −B. Such compensation of the owners of old capital — even if stretched over time — would in-
ﬂate the allowances ˜ δ ˜ K and additionally shrink the tax base during the early transition, leading
to even larger short-run losses in tax revenue.
We implement a series of transition scenarios that highlight the trade-oﬀ between short-run
losses and long-run gains of moving towards an S-base cash-ﬂow tax. These scenarios point to
three key factors in determining this trade-oﬀ: (i) the treatment of old capital to avoid windfall
gains or losses; (ii) the speed of implementing the reform, i.e. instantaneous versus gradual
introduction; (iii) the use of public debt for intertemporal budget balance with tax smoothing.
Without tax smoothing, annual budget balance would require very high tax rates in the short-
run when introduction of the S-base tax yields particularly high revenue losses. Once growth
sets in, tax bases expand and tax rates can be reduced. Instead of accepting very high wage
tax rates in the short-run with damaging labor market eﬀects, the scenario allows for transitory
deﬁcits and accumulates debt in a way that reduces wage tax rates in the short-run and raises
them in the future to service higher debt until rates are equalized over the entire time horizon.
Gradual implementation of the S-base system is modeled as follows. The value of a given
ǫ-parameter deﬁning the tax base is equal to ǫ1 in the status quo and ǫT in the S-base system.
For example, instantaneous investment expensing would be ǫI
1 = 0 before and ǫI
T = 1 after full
implementation of the reform. Gradual implementation sets a time path ǫt = ǫT+(ǫ1 − ǫT)  t−1,
where   < 1 is the transition speed. The same reform speed   is applied to all other ǫ-parameters
discussed above. Slowing down the transition limits short-run revenue losses but also postpones
to some extent the favorable incentive and growth eﬀects of the reform.
92.3 Simulation Model
For quantitative evaluation, we use a dynamic general equilibrium model which is calibrated to
replicate the data of the German economy. In essence, it is a neoclassical growth model of an
open economy with an internationally given interest rate which features intertemporally opti-
mizing investment and savings, endogenous labor supply along intensive and extensive margins,
and a detailed modeling of the tax system. A novel aspect of the model is that it takes account
of involuntary unemployment reﬂecting job search of households and job creation of ﬁrms. This
should be particularly important for an analysis of tax reform in Germany where the unem-
ployment rate has ﬂuctuated around 10 percent in recent periods.5 The household sector is
based on an overlapping generations model with a period length of one year where agents are
analytically aggregated into a limited number of age groups. We distinguish 5 active worker
groups and 3 retired age groups. The overlapping generations structure allows us to address
intergenerational distribution eﬀects of several alternative transition strategies of tax reform. A
complete mathematical documentation is found in Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2009).
Households supply work eﬀort, search for jobs and save to smooth consumption in the face
of uneven life-cycle income patterns. Accumulated wealth is invested in internationally traded
bonds and government debt as well as equity and debt of the business sector. Assuming a strong
home bias in asset ownership, equity is fully held by domestic investors. Firms hire workers on a
frictional labor market, invest in new equipment and endogenously choose the capital structure.
Fiscal spending is on public consumption and transfers to households. Tax revenue consists of
several types of capital income taxes on the investor and ﬁrm level, labor income taxes and
indirect taxes. Public debt may be used to shift the tax burden between present and future
generations. In addition, there is a pay as you go pension system, balancing contributions and
pensions, and an unemployment insurance system collecting contributions of employed workers
and paying beneﬁts to the unemployed. Labor supply can thus change on the intensive and
extensive margins, i.e. by varying hours of work (or work eﬀort) of the employed and job search
of currently unemployed workers.
5Substantial empirical research points to important eﬀects of business tax reform on the unemployment rate.
Keuschnigg (2009) analytically discusses the transmission channels and the implications of policy reform.
10Table 1: Model Parameters
Investment and Financing:
g Growth rate of labor productivity 0.015
i Real interest rate, gross 0.052
r Real interest rate, net 0.040
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.076
b Share of external debt ﬁnancing 0.600
α Share of capital income 0.350
τI Eﬀective tax rate, investment 0.133
τS Eﬀective tax rate, savings 0.237
τ Eﬀective tax rate, total capital 0.338
Consumption and Labor Supply:
σC Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.350
τL Eﬀective tax rate, young, hours worked 0.350
τJS Eﬀective tax rate, young, job search 0.688
Frictional Labor Market:
ξ Bargaining power employees 0.750
η Matching elasticity w.r.t. job search 0.500
¯ u Average unemployment rate 0.105
Table 1 reports the most important parameters. Some of them are standard and are, thus,
not discussed in much detail (see Altig et al., 2001, for a comparison). The interest rate and
the growth rate of labor productivity and of GDP reﬂect long-run averages for Germany. About
60% of investment is externally ﬁnanced (see OECD Economic Outlook, December 2004). The
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is chosen to replicate empirical estimates
of the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital (see Table 2 below).
The eﬀective tax rates on hours worked of actively employed and on job search of unemployed
workers summarize the total tax burden from wage income taxes, (employee) social security
contributions and indirect taxes. The eﬀective tax rate on hours worked amounts to 35% for
the youngest age group (20-30 years-old) and rises to 40% for the 40-50 years-old with higher
earnings. The eﬀective tax rate on job search is substantially larger and amounts to 69%. Like a
11participation tax rate, this rate summarizes the total ﬁscal burden that accrues when switching
from unemployment into employment. Essentially, it corresponds to the wage and contribution
tax burden plus the forgone unemployment beneﬁt as a share of earnings. The replacement
rate of unemployment beneﬁts alone amounts to roughly 50%. Such high participation tax rates
are usual in Europe, see Immervoll et al. (2007). The bargaining power of employees in wage
negotiation and the matching elasticity determine the wage and unemployment rates in labor
market equilibrium. When the bargaining power is larger than the matching elasticity as in
Table 1, the unemployment rate is ineﬃciently high (see Hosios, 1990). A reduction in the
unemployment rate would yield signiﬁcant welfare gains.
Table 2 summarizes behavioral elasticities in long-run equilibrium. Given the consensus
of econometric estimates, as discussed in Immervoll et al. (2007) and Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999), the elasticity of intensive labor supply (eﬀective hours worked) with respect to the net
real wage is set to ǫL = 0.2. Accordingly, a 1% larger net real wage results in a reduction of the
eﬀective hours worked by 0.2%. The ﬁscal eﬀects on the unemployment rate reﬂect econometric
evidence for OECD countries. Scarpetta (1996) estimated that an increase of by 10% in the
replacement rate for unemployment beneﬁts results in an increase of 1.3 percentage points in the
unemployment rate. This value is consistent with the estimates of 1.7 in Layard et al. (1991),
1.1 in Nickel (1997) and similar in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), see Holmlund (1998) for a
summary of the empirical literature. We parametrize our model such that an increase in the
replacement rate by 10% raises the unemployment rate by 1.4 percentage points, i.e. ǫU = 1.4.
The parametrization of ﬁrms’ debt behavior is based on Gordon and Lee (2001). The study
estimates an elasticity ǫB = 0.36, implying that an increase in the proﬁt tax by 10 percentage
points would raise the debt ratio by 3.6 percentage points. Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim
(1998) study the reaction of external debt to changes in tax rates and get a similar elasticity
of 0.426. The growth eﬀects of a tax reform depend crucially on how sensitive investment and
capital accumulation are to a tax induced cut in the user cost of capital. Hassett and Hubbard
(2002) review the econometric literature and put the elasticity of capital demand with respect to
the user cost of capital in the range between -0.5 and -1. According to De Mooij and Ederveen
(2003), the response of direct investment of multinational ﬁrms is even stronger. Hence, we set
the elasticity of capital demand at ǫK = −1 and calibrate the elasticity of substitution between
12capital and labor to replicate this elasticity.
Capital accumulation is a slow process and aﬀects output, wages and tax revenue only after
some delay. In an open economy, and according to the q-theory of investment (see Hayashi,
1982), the length of the transition phase is controlled by adjustment costs to investment. It is
optimal for ﬁrms to spread investment over several periods and avoid excessive ﬂuctuations. We
calibrate adjustment cost parameters to replicate estimates of the transition speed as measured
by the half-life of capital stock adjustment. According to estimates by Cummins, Hassett and
Hubbard (1996), and the overview of the empirical literature in Hassett and Hubbard (2002),
about half of the long-run adjustment in the capital stock is achieved within 7 to 8 years.
Table 2: Behavioral Elasticities in Equilibrium
Elasticity hours worked ǫL 0.205
Elasticity unemployment rate ǫU 1.417
Elasticity debt ratio ǫB 0.365
Elasticity investment ǫK -0.951
Half-life of capital stock adjustment T0.5 8.000
Legend: ǫL %-increase in hours worked wrt. 1% higher
real wage. ǫU %-points unemployment rate wrt. 10%
higher replacement rate of un employment insurance. ǫB
%-points debt ratio wrt. 1%-point higher corporate tax
rate. ǫK %-decrease in capital stock wrt. 1% higher user
cost. T0.5 half-life of capital adjustment in years.
Figure 1 documents eﬀective marginal tax rates on investment and savings that result from
ﬁrm and personal level taxes including special provisions in the tax base. The left side illustrates
the current situation where the ﬁrst group of bars corresponds to the numbers in Table 1. The
Figure also computes these rates separately for diﬀerent modes of ﬁnance. A fully debt ﬁnanced
investment is subject to a slightly negative rate and, hence, is eﬀectively subsidized at the ﬁrm
level. Since the cost of debt is tax deductible, there is no disincentive from the proﬁt tax rate,
see also the discussion of (4). However, also a fully debt ﬁnanced investment beneﬁts from
accelerated tax depreciation and other investment incentives, leading to a small subsidy.
Interest earnings, dividends and capital gains are taxed at a uniform rate at the investor
level but capital gains are taxable only upon realization and beneﬁt from tax deferral. Hence,
13the personal level eﬀective tax is slightly lower in case of equity ﬁnance, as compared to a
debt ﬁnanced investment. Equity ﬁnancing reﬂects a mix between retained earnings and new
share issues where the latter represents a relatively small share. Since the returns on self-
ﬁnanced investment mainly accrue in terms of capital gains, the personal tax burden on such
an investment is considerably lower compared to the case of new equity, reﬂecting the tax
advantage from deferral until realization. Considering the total eﬀective tax rates reveals a
ranking of alternative ways of investment ﬁnancing, where debt is cheapest and new equity the













Figure 1: Eﬀective Marginal Tax Rates
The right hand side of the Figure shows eﬀective tax rates after a complete implementation
of the S-base cash-ﬂow tax. As was shown in the preceding subsection, the reform completely
eliminates the investment and ﬁnancing distortions at the ﬁrm level, reducing to zero the eﬀective
tax rate on investment and leading to a reduction of the total wedge by 13 percentage points in
the case of mixed ﬁnancing. The remaining part of the eﬀective tax rate stems from personal
6The labels RE and NS stand for retained earnings and new shares.
14capital income taxation. Note, however, that this is a savings and not an investment distortion.
The residence principle of interest taxation implies that personal taxation of government and
internationally traded bonds yields a net return r =
￿
1 − tB￿
i∗, see the Appendix. Investors
insist on the same net return on equity which accrues in terms of dividends and capital gains,
taxable at (eﬀective) rates tD and tG. The composition of equity returns is determined by the
ﬁrms’ pay-out ratio θ, giving an eﬀective tax rate tE = θtD + (1 − θ)tG on equity returns.
Hence, the cost of equity before personal taxes is iE = r/
￿
1 − tE￿
< i∗. Current capital income
taxation in Germany implies tB = tD > tG where the eﬀective tax rate on capital gains is lower
due to tax deferral until realization. Hence, tE < tB, leading to iE < i∗. As a result, the market
rate of return on investment in Germany could be even slightly lower than the world rate of
interest. Moving towards an S-base cash-ﬂow tax thus eliminates the investment wedge but is
not entirely neutral with respect to ﬁnancing choices. Personal level taxes slightly favor equity
over debt and, in particular, retained earnings relative to new share issues. Figure 1 illustrates.
However, the distortion in capital structure choice is much less dramatic than before the reform
where the eﬀective tax rate is 45% with equity ﬁnancing but only 23% with debt ﬁnancing. The
S-Base tax adds new debt to the tax base so that, after the reform, the marginal tax burden on
new investment is roughly equal across ﬁnancing modes, debt or equity.
3 Quantitative Results
3.1 Long-Run Results
Table 3 reports long-run simulation results of moving to an S-base cash-ﬂow tax in Germany.
Compared to current tax rules, the scenario involves the following changes: (i) immediate ex-
pensing replaces normal tax depreciation of new investment; (ii) ﬁrms must add new debt to
the tax base but may subtract repayment of existing debt from taxable proﬁts. As is current
practice, interest on debt remains deductible while the cost of equity is not. It was shown in
Section 2 that the S-base tax is neutral with respect to ﬁrms’ investment and capital structure
choices. Given that the corporate tax rate cannot be changed,7 the narrowing of the tax base
7Although beyond the model, a higher tax rate might induce proﬁt shifting by multinationals and thereby
make a revenue neutral increase in the corporate tax rate rather unattractive and expensive. Germany is already
15looses revenue which must be raised from other sources. Speciﬁcally, we assume per capita public
consumption to remain constant in all scenarios, as well as government debt (except in the last
scenario). To highlight the consequences of alternative ways of ﬁnancing tax reform, we run four
diﬀerent scenarios corresponding to the columns in Table 3 which use lump-sum, consumption
and wage taxes (columns ‘LS’, ‘Cons’ and ‘Wage’, respectively) to ﬁnance tax reform.
Table 3: Long-Run Eﬀects of an S-Base Cash-Flow Tax
Absolute Changes: ISS LS Cons Wage Trans1
Add. wage/cons. tax 0.000 tj 0.000 -0.034 -0.045 0.036
User cost of capital 0.060 uK 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
Debt to capital ratio 0.600 b 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525
Eﬀ.tax rate, investment 0.133 τI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Eﬀ.tax rate, savings 0.237 τS 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225
Eﬀ.tax rate labor 0.350 τL
1 0.353 0.334 0.322 0.377
Unemployment rate 0.105 ¯ u 0.092 0.090 0.084 0.099
Percentage Changes:
Corporate-tax revenue TK -13.581 -12.802 -10.578 -16.115
Gross wage ¯ w 3.490 3.550 3.212 3.737
Eﬀective hours worked ¯ l 0.688 1.365 1.741 -0.188
Eﬀective labor demand LD 2.111 3.033 4.080 0.464
Capital stock K 15.619 16.663 17.848 13.754
GDP Y 6.681 7.644 8.737 4.959
Private consumption C 5.299 6.467 7.400 -0.620
Private ﬁnancial wealth A 1.700 2.070 2.318 1.841
Legend: (LS): Financing with lump-sum tax; (Cons): Financing with con-
sumption/VAT tax; (Wage): Financing with wage tax; (Trans1): Financing
with wage tax and government debt policy.
A discussion of alternative transition strategies is postponed to the next subsection. Transi-
tion relief is not relevant for long-run results, except when the government uses debt to smooth
tax rates over time as in the last column of Table 3. Of course, redistribution from future to
present generations by accumulating debt in the early transition phase does change the long-run
perceived as a high tax country for businesses.
16equilibrium. The wage tax scenario with an instantaneous introduction of the S-base system
requires high wage tax rates early on and low ones in the future to balance the budget, therefore
imposing a large transition burden on current workers. The scenario ‘Trans1’ in the last column
relies on deﬁcit ﬁnancing to prevent large increases in tax rates in the early phase. In this way,
future generations will not only beneﬁt in terms of a higher capital stock and higher wages but
they also share in the transition cost by paying higher taxes to service the accumulated debt.
The debt policy is endogenously chosen to achieve perfect tax smoothing, i.e. the wage tax rate
is adjusted once and for all and stays constant in all periods after the reform.
Lump-Sum Tax Financing: This hypothetical scenario, referring to column LS, is of
little relevance to real world tax policy and is only meant to illustrate the incentive eﬀects of
the reform without mixing with the inﬂuence of other taxes. Section 2 has shown the S-base
tax to be neutral with respect to investment and capital structure decisions. The main long-run
eﬀects thus stem from reducing the eﬀective tax rate on investment from 13% to zero, and from
undoing the tax incentive to use external debt, see Figure 1 for illustration. Eliminating the
tax preference for debt reduces the debt asset ratio from 60 to 52%. This should make ﬁrms
ﬁnancially more robust. The reduction in the user cost triggers an investment boom and expands
the capital stock by 15% in the long-run. Given a cost share and, thus, an output elasticity of
capital equal to .35, as reported in Table 1, capital accumulation alone leads to a 5.5% increase
in GDP (≈ .35×.156). The higher capital intensity, in turn, boosts labor productivity and wages
by 3.5%. With lump-sum tax ﬁnance, wage and consumption tax rates remain constant so that
net of tax real wages must rise by the same amount. Higher wage earnings stimulate intensive
and extensive labor supply. The increased earnings relative to unemployment beneﬁts boost job
search and reduce unemployment by 1.3 percentage points. More hours worked together with
lower unemployment expand eﬀective employment by 2.1% in the long-run. More employment
reinforces the output gains from capital accumulation. In total, GDP is 6.7% larger in the
long-run compared to the growth path in the absence of reform.
Moving to an S-base cash-ﬂow tax substantially narrows the tax base but reduces taxable
corporate proﬁts only by 13.6% in the long-run. A much larger decline in corporate tax revenues
is prevented by induced capital accumulation which boosts corporate earnings. The expansionary
eﬀects of the reform further swell the tax bases and the revenue yield of other taxes. In the
17long-run, higher revenue (from other taxes) more than compensates the reduction in proﬁt
taxes. Fiscal balance thus allows higher transfers to private households which add to higher
wage earnings and augment private consumption and wealth by 5.3% and 1.7%, respectively.
It will become evident below that a large part of these long-run gains eﬀectively result from
intergenerational redistribution towards future generations and are, thus, the mirror image of
rather unfavorable short-run eﬀects.
Consumption Tax Financing: Using lump-sum instruments is usually not an option for
real world tax policy. We thus contrast the eﬀects of the reform when tax rates on consumption
(commodity taxes such as VAT) or wage income are adjusted to balance the budget (columns
‘Cons’ and ‘Wage’ in Table 3). As we have just argued, the strong expansionary impact expands
tax bases to an extent that more than compensates for the direct revenue losses of narrowing
the tax base by moving to an S-base system. As a result, the consumption tax rate can be
cut by 3.4 percentage points in the long-run. However, since lower commodity taxes strengthen
real income of both employed and unemployed workers in the same way, the real income gap
between work and non-participation is not much aﬀected, leaving incentives for job search largely
unaﬀected. The unemployment rate falls by a negligible amount only. While extensive labor
supply is not responsive, the higher net real wage almost doubles the increase in eﬀective hours
worked, compared to the ﬁrst scenario, and leads to a 1.4% gain in eﬀective hours worked in the
long-run. Eﬀective employment rises by 3% instead of 2% with lump-sum ﬁnancing, and GDP
growth is similarly magniﬁed, leading to a total gain of 7.6%. Hence, moving to an S-base tax
yields a ‘double dividend’ in the long-run since the tax reform not only improves investment
incentives and removes tax distortions in capital structure choice, but also yields additional
ﬁscal revenue which can be used to reduce labor market distortions. Again, one must emphasize
that the additional revenue is available only in the long-run, when the transition costs and the
associated burden on present generations are already sunk.
Wage Tax Financing: Consumption taxes discriminate less towards job search and labor
market participation since not only active earnings but also replacement income are subject
to this tax when income is spent. In contrast, a lower wage tax not only stimulates intensive
but also extensive labor supply by augmenting the income gap between work and non-work
and, thereby, strengthening job search incentives. The long-run impact of moving to an S-base
18tax thus looks even more favorable than in the preceding scenario. Given that wage tax rates
can be reduced by 4.5 percentage points, the more signiﬁcant rise in eﬀective hours worked is
reinforced by a substantial reduction of the unemployment rate to 8.4% (compared to 9% in
the consumption tax scenario). This adds an extra percentage point to the long-run increase in
total employment and GDP which now rise by 4% and 8.7%, respectively.
The simulation results also point to a new channel of the labor market and ﬁscal impact
of corporate tax reform in the presence of a large welfare state (see Keuschnigg, 2009, for the
analytical argument). Given that the tax reform boosts investment incentives and raises wages,
it strengthens job search (or labor market participation, more broadly). The resulting decline
in unemployment yields very favorable ﬁscal gains which are proportional to participation tax
rates, deﬁned as the sum of replacement rates plus tax and social security contributions. Each
person switching from unemployment into employment represents one more worker paying wage
taxes and social security contributions, and is one person less who claims unemployment beneﬁts,
social assistance and other welfare beneﬁts. Based on a stylized theoretical model, Keuschnigg
(2009) shows that with current participation tax rates varying around 50-80% in Europe (see
Immervoll et al., 2007, and the eﬀective tax rate on job search in Table 1), a reduction in
the proﬁt tax rate may actually improve ﬁscal balance due to savings in social spending and
higher wage tax and contribution revenues. The long-run results in Table 3 clearly point to the
importance of this channel. As before, the large size of the long-run gains are to a considerable
extent due to intergenerational redistribution at the cost of present generations.
Wage Tax Smoothing: The last column ‘Trans1’ in Table 3 is the ﬁrst scenario with
transition relief and is illustrated in Figure 2. The need for transition relief arises because
the wage tax scenario in column ‘Wage’ is based on periodic budget balance and requires a
large increase in short-run wage tax rates. Moving to an S-Base system looses a large amount
of corporate tax revenue, not only because of the instantaneous introduction of investment
expensing but also because the scenario assumes that 50% of old equity capital K −B is added
to the tax depreciable capital stock which is meant to avoid a one time devaluation of old
capital when new capital is favored by an instantaneous deduction from tax. This measure
generates large additional tax depreciation in the early adjustment period and magniﬁes the
loss in tax revenue. Moving to immediate expensing erodes the tax base particularly strongly
19since investment is highest in the early phase to start capital accumulation. Finally, and maybe
most importantly, when moving to an S-base system, ﬁrms must add new debt to the tax base











0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Status quo
Periodic balance










0 20 40 60 80
Debt Status Quo
Tax Smoothing
Fig. 2: Tax Smoothing
The ﬁnancial neutrality of the S-base tax leads ﬁrms to reduce their debt asset ratio from
around 60 to 52%. Firms achieve this by repaying a substantial part of preexisting debt to bring
down the debt asset ratio. This debt repayment in the ﬁrst period is ﬁnanced by issuing large
amounts of new shares. Only later on, ﬁrms will issue new debt again to accommodate capital
accumulation. The debt repayment in the ﬁrst period also subtracts from the tax base. In this
extreme scenario, all elements together lead to a negative tax base so that the government must
pay large subsidies to the business sector instead of collecting tax revenues. When these large
revenue losses must be periodically ﬁnanced out of wage tax revenue, budget balance requires
a drastic increase in wage tax rates. Figure 2 shows that the government would have to add
about 42 percentage points to the current wage tax schedule. Clearly, this worst case scenario
must have very unfavorable short-run consequences. In subsequent periods, when ﬁrms issue
again new debt and must add this to the tax base under an S-base system, and given that old
20tax depreciation claims are increasingly written oﬀ, corporate tax losses rapidly disappear and
tax revenues grow fast in this period of high transitional growth. After less than three decades,
wage tax rates fall below the tax rates applied prior to reform and asymptotically approach the
long-run equilibrium value in Table 3 where these rates would be lower by 4.5 percentage points.
However, lower long-run wage tax rates are possible only because this shock therapy with
instantaneous budget balance imposes the full transition cost of moving to an S-base system
on present generations living in the early transition period. One strategy for distributing gains
and costs of tax reform more evenly across present and future generations is to resort to deﬁcit
ﬁnancing in the early transition period. Using deﬁcit ﬁnance to reduce overly high wage taxes
early on necessarily requires higher tax rates in the future to service the accumulated public
debt. Figure 2 illustrates this tax smoothing scenario where deﬁcits are incurred and debt is
accumulated to an extent that is consistent with a once and for all change in the wage tax rates.
Simulations show that public debt would almost double from 68 to 133, or in terms of GDP
ratios from 68.2 to 127%, and the wage tax schedule would shift up once and for all by 3.6
percentage points. Compared to column ‘Wage’ in Table 3 referring to periodic budget balance,
the diﬀerence is more than 8 percentage points of the wage tax rate.
The higher wage tax in the long-run has unfavorable labor market consequences. The un-
employment rate is 9.9 instead of 8.4%, and hours worked shrink by 0.2% instead of an increase
by 1.7%. Employment growth is almost wiped out and, for this reason, cuts oﬀ about four
percentage points of the increase in the capital stock. Compared to the uncompensated case
with strong redistribution from present to future generations, tax smoothing requires future
generations to pay for the transition cost in terms of higher debt. The GDP gain is only 5%
and much more modest than the 8.7% increase in the uncompensated scenario. The positive
side of this scenario is that deﬁcit ﬁnancing avoids the large increase in wage tax rates and gives
a much brighter picture in the short-run. Compared to the uncompensated scenario in column
‘Wage’, the unemployment rate in the ﬁrst period rises only slightly to 11% (instead of 20.5%),
total employment declines only by 1.4% (instead of 21%), and GDP shrinks by less than 1% as
a result of weaker labor market performance (instead of an instantaneous GDP contraction of
14.2% with uncompensated ‘shock therapy’). The important insight is that spreading the tax
burden over present and future generations is successful in avoiding large short-run income losses
21from introducing a cash-ﬂow tax but also substantially reduces the long-run growth eﬀects of
the reform. In the next subsection we investigate a number of alternative transition strategies
that aim at a more favorable trade-oﬀ between long-run gains and short-run costs.
3.2 Transition Strategies
Transition Problems: The preceding subsection has illustrated a stark trade-oﬀ between
short-run costs and long-run beneﬁts of dynamic tax reform. The income gains of a growth
oriented tax reform are delayed since the productivity gains from capital deepening arrive only
after a prolonged period of accumulation. Only those generations living in the more distant
future will be able to fully beneﬁt from higher capital stocks and wages while present generations
are confronted with large increases in other distorting taxes which tend to harm labor market
performance and can result in a signiﬁcant loss in present income. The previous subsection has
identiﬁed three important sources of revenue losses at the date of reform when moving to an
S-base cash-ﬂow tax: introduction of immediate investment expensing, repayment of existing
debt to move towards a lower debt capital ratio, and ‘compensation’ of old capital to prevent
windfall losses. In contrast to new capital, previously invested old capital has not beneﬁted from
immediate expensing but its market value might decline in the absence of compensation when
new capital gets cheaper. While transitory deﬁcit ﬁnance can avoid a large part of the present
income losses and forces future generations to share in the short-run costs, such a strategy
also diminishes the long-run gains of the reform. Taking the previous scenario ‘Trans1’ as a
benchmark, we now compare this with alternative transition scenarios. This will clarify the role
of reform speed and of the treatment of old capital in shaping the intertemporal trade-oﬀ.
Understanding the forces determining revaluation of old capital and, thus, the sources of
windfall gains and losses, is critical for the design of a transition policy. To uncover the key
arguments in the simplest way, assume that the acquisition cost of a new capital good is 1 prior
to reform and is subsidized by the factor 1−tK after moving to a cash-ﬂow tax. Suppose that the
present value of future earnings and, thus, the market value of an installed capital good, is η
￿
iE￿
where the discount factor iE depends only on personal level taxes and is independent of the proﬁt
tax rate. When the capital stock is costlessly adjusted and ﬁrms can instantaneously realize the
desired long-run capital intensity, the investment criterion is η
￿
iE￿
= 1 − tK, indicating that
22ﬁrms invest until the present value of future returns and, thus, the market value of an installed
capital good, is equal to the current acquisition cost of new equipment. Hence, with frictionless
investment, introducing a cash-ﬂow tax reduces the acquisition cost from 1 to 1−tK and, thereby,
also imposes a one time windfall loss on old capital goods.
However, when installing a substantially higher capital stock creates additional adjustment
costs JI, the investment condition becomes η
￿
iE￿
= 1−tK +JI.8 While these adjustment costs
are small at normal investment levels (JI = 0 in a stationary state), they can become substantial
at above normal investment levels required to build up a larger capital stock. Investment and,
thus, adjustment costs are highest immediately after implementing the reform because ﬁrms are
still far oﬀ the desired long-run levels of capital. Hence, the present value of future returns equal
to the market value of a capital good must not only pay for the lower acquisition cost 1 − tK
but also for substantial adjustment costs JI. While η = 1 prior to reform, valuation will be
η = 1 − tK + JI immediately after implementation of the reform. Hence, the market value of
new and old capital can increase or decrease, leading to windfall gains or losses on old capital.
Which outcome prevails, depends on the degree of frictions in the adjustment process and the
stickiness of capital accumulation.
It is not clear at all whether old capital should be compensated or, in contrast, should be
subject to a one time tax to prevent windfall gains. The question can only be decided empirically
and must take account of possible adjustment costs as in the present simulation model. Three
factors are important in determining the revaluation of old capital and the magnitude of induced
windfall gains or losses. One determinant is the dynamics of the accumulation process as reﬂected
in the half-life of investment, see Table 2. Another factor is the speed of tax reform, whether
reform is implemented instantaneously like a shock therapy, or is implemented only gradually
over time. A third factor is tax treatment of old capital. For example, old capital might be
compensated for potential windfall losses by allowing a proportion of equity to be added to
the tax depreciable capital stock and to be written oﬀ in subsequent years. A novel feature of
the simulation model is that it also includes lump-sum components of ﬁrm value unrelated to
new investment and the capital stock. Such elements are historic tax depreciation claims as
8This is a stylized version of A.4 in the Appendix and reﬂects the q-theory of investment underlying a large
part of the empirical investment literature, see Blanchard and Fischer (1989) or Romer (1996), for example.
23included in the tax depreciable capital stock ˜ K, see section 2.1. The present value of future tax
deductions boosts ﬁrm value independent of investment levels.9 One way of compensating old
capital is to add a fraction of the book value K −B of old equity capital to the tax depreciable
capital stock, thereby allowing value increasing tax deductions unrelated to new investment
and without consequences for investment incentives. Alternatively, should market forces lead to
windfall gains, the historic tax depreciable capital stock can be reduced once and for all, thereby
reducing lump-sum tax allowances during the transition in order to eliminate windfall gains.
We now discuss four alternative transition scenarios that highlight the role of reform speed
and the tax treatment of old capital. In all cases, the ﬁscal budget is balanced by scaling
the wage tax schedule and public debt is used for perfect tax smoothing: (1) The benchmark
scenario is the ‘shock therapy’ of the scenario ‘Trans1’ in the ﬁrst column of Table 4, which
corresponds to the last column of Table 3 and is characterized by instantaneous introduction
of the new S-base system, full allowances for historic tax depreciation claims and tax relief for
50% of existing equity capital. (2) Scenario ‘Trans2’ features a gradual introduction of the
new system, gives no tax relief on old capital, but continues tax allowances for historic tax
depreciation claims. Section 2.2 discussed how gradual introduction weighs together the old and
new deﬁnitions of the tax base with a variable factor. The transition speed for tax reform is
set at   = .85, meaning that it takes between 4 to 5 years to implement half and roughly 9
years to complete about three quarters of the changes in tax parameters etc. (3) The scenario
‘Trans3’ opts for instantaneous reform but denies any tax relief on old capital. The historic tax
depreciable capital stock ˜ K is fully written oﬀ, i.e. depreciation allowances are largest in the ﬁrst
period and then decline at rate ˜ δ in the early transition phase. (4) Scenario ‘Trans4’ combines
‘shock therapy’ with a one time tax on old capital in terms of a one time devaluation of the tax
depreciable capital stock (reducing ˜ K yields smaller tax allowances in subsequent periods) so
that the equilibrium change in the value of the capital stock is just zero at the date of reform.
The devaluation is endogenously computed so that there are neither windfall gains nor losses on
old capital. Table 4 reports the long-run consequences of these scenarios which depend on the
degree of debt accumulated during transition for perfect tax smoothing. The ﬁrst line lists the
long-run debt to GDP ratios while the last line reports the windfall gains or losses which are
9This essentially explains the diﬀerence between average and marginal q as in Hayashi (1982), as is documented
in the separate Appendix Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2009) for the present model.
24measured by the percentage changes of ﬁrm value at the date of tax reform.
Table 4: Long-run Eﬀects of Alternative Transition Strategies
Absolute Changes: ISS Trans1 Trans2 Trans3 Trans4
Public debt/GDP ratio 0.676 dG 1.270 1.168 1.202 0.941
Additional wage tax 0.000 tL 0.036 0.023 0.027 -0.005
Eﬀ. tax rate labor 0.350 τL
1 0.377 0.369 0.372 0.349
Unemployment rate 0.105 ¯ u 0.099 0.096 0.097 0.091
Percentage Changes:
Corporate tax revenue TK -16.115 -15.198 -15.500 -13.225
Gross wage ¯ w 3.737 3.646 3.676 3.456
Eﬀective labor demand LD 0.464 1.058 0.863 2.343
Capital stock K 13.754 14.427 14.206 15.882
GDP Y 4.959 5.581 5.376 6.923
Private consumption C -0.620 0.642 0.224 3.444
Firm value, t = 1 V1 15.613 -0.800 12.442 -0.001
Legend: (Trans1): instantaneous implementation, 50% equity relief; (Trans2):
slow implementation, 0% equity relief; (Trans3): instantaneous implementa-
tion, 0% equity relief; (Trans4): instantaneous implementation, 0% equity
relief, and -81.224 % reduction of tax depreciable capital stock. All scenarios
use public debt to smooth wage tax rates for all periods.
Transition Scenario ‘Trans1’: The benchmark scenario of instantaneous reform was
discussed at the end of section 3.1. It corresponds to the last column of Table 3 which is
repeated in the ﬁrst column of Table 4. The last line immediately reveals that giving tax relief
to 50% of equity capital is much too generous and leads to windfall gains at the date of reform
equal to a 15.6% increase in ﬁrm values.
Transition Scenario ‘Trans2’: Compared to the benchmark, this scenario gradually
introduces the S-base system, with half of the reform completed within 4 to 5 years and 3
quarters within 9 years. No tax relief on old equity capital is ceded but tax allowances on
historic depreciation claims are continued until the stock is fully depreciated. Compared to
‘shock therapy’, a gradual reform slows down the transition, limits short-run revenue losses and,
thus, accumulates less debt to smooth tax rates. For this reason, the debt to GDP ratio in
25Table 4, column ‘Trans2’, is only 116% of GDP, compared to 127% in the ﬁrst scenario. The
wage tax rate must rise, once and forever, by 2.3 percentage points instead of 3.6 points. The
more moderate tax burden slightly improves labor market performance in the long-run which
translates into a GDP gain of 5.6% instead of 4.9%. Gradual reform with tax smoothing leads


























Fig. 3: Alternative Transition Strategies
However, gradual implementation also means that investment incentives are weaker in the
early adjustment period when tax reform is not yet fully implemented. Compared to instan-
taneous reform, capital accumulation, output expansion and growth in labor productivity are
all postponed. Although the decline in GDP and rise in unemployment are smaller in the ﬁrst
two years after reform, the subsequent output growth is much delayed and remains signiﬁcantly
smaller. Only after about 35 years, GDP gets larger than in scenario 1 with instantaneous
reform. As Figure 3 illustrates, the unemployment rate falls below the rate in scenario 1 after
about 25 periods. Somewhat surprisingly, a gradual reform does not reduce transition costs.
Quite to the contrary, because the scenario boosts investment incentives only at a slow rate,
26the growth eﬀects of the reform are delayed, leading to a prolonged transition period with lower
income and higher unemployment than with shock therapy. For the same reason, the scenario
entirely wipes out the large windfall gains which resulted in scenario 1, see Table 3.
Transition Scenario ‘Trans3’: Given the large windfall gains in the benchmark case
(column ‘Trans1’), this scenario provides no tax relief for equity at all, but continues depreciation
allowances on historically accumulated claims until the tax depreciable stock ˜ K is fully written
oﬀ. Table 4 and Figure 3 show a moderate improvement relative to the benchmark strategy,
yielding somewhat higher GDP and lower unemployment over the entire transition and in the
long-run. Avoiding tax relief for old equity does not harm growth but contains the revenue
loss in the short-run. Less public debt is accumulated for tax smoothing during the transition,
leading to a debt GDP ratio of 120 instead of 127% in the long-run. Hence, the labor tax
burden is lower and economic performance is slightly better as compared to the benchmark
case. In providing strong growth incentives right from the beginning, this scenario still leads to
a substantial increase in the market value of installed capital and, thus, to substantial windfall
gains. At the date of reform, the value of old capital rises by 12%.
Transition Scenario ‘Trans4’: Windfall gains indicate a too generous treatment of old
capital which only redistributes wealth towards the owners of the current capital stock without
yielding any beneﬁts in terms of growth. To avoid such redistribution, scenario 4 devalues
the historic tax depreciable capital stock ˜ K by more than 80% which reduces tax allowances,
inﬂates corporate tax payments in the early transition phase, and reduces ﬁrm value at the date
of reform. Essentially, the measure imposes a one time wealth tax on current capital owners
and is computed to exactly eliminate any windfall gains or losses. In strengthening corporate
tax revenue during the early transition phase, this measure much reduces the amount of public
debt needed for tax smoothing. The last column in Table 4 therefore reports a long-run debt
GDP ratio of 94% which is much lower than the 127% in the baseline scenario. The once and
for all wage tax adjustment is roughly zero and avoids a negative impact of tax reform on labor
market performance. Since both employment and the capital stock are unaﬀected in the ﬁrst
period, the scenario prevents any negative short-run impact. In parallel to capital accumulation,
wages, employment and output increase right from the beginning, and the unemployment rate
immediately falls as Figure 3 illustrates.
27In avoiding windfall gains, this transition strategy boosts the growth potential of moving
to an S-base system. The long-run eﬀects are much better than in any of the other scenarios.
Unemployment falls quite signiﬁcantly from 10.5 to 9%, employment expands by 2.3%, and
GDP rises by almost 7%. Figure 3 shows better economic performance over the entire transition
period. We conclude that a transition strategy for a favorable economic outcome now and in
the future should (i) implement the reform instantaneously to reduce investment and ﬁnancing
distortions at the earliest possible date, and (ii) avoid windfall gains for present equity owners.
The latter requirement might often be administratively diﬃcult and is achieved here by a one
time reduction of the historically accumulated, tax depreciable capital stock. In reducing tax
allowances and inﬂating corporate tax liability in the early transition period, this measure re-
duces ﬁrm value at the date of reform and acts like a one time wealth tax which exactly oﬀsets
the market induced appreciation of old capital.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Simulation results are sensitive to variations of key parameters. Econometric estimates of be-
havioral parameters are often imprecise and sometimes vary over a considerable range. For the
present purposes, the elasticity of capital demand and labor supply elasticities with respect to
hours worked and job search are important. We don’t explore these sensitivities here since they
are well known in the literature. The focus of this study is on the design of transition strategies
which importantly hinge on the revaluation of the preexisting capital stock at the date of re-
form. By the q-theory of investment, windfall gains or losses depend on the dynamics of capital
formation. As discussed in Table 2, the half-life of investment is estimated at 8 years. It takes 8
years to complete half of the adjustment from any initial condition to the long-run value. After
another 8 years, the remaining gap is halved, etc. As argued before, the value of capital would
fall to the long-run value in the ﬁrst period if adjustment costs were absent and capital could be
instantaneously adjusted. If capital is costly to adjust and accumulation is slow, the value of a
unit of capital might well increase at the date of reform before it approaches the lower long-run
value. Hence, compared to a normal adjustment speed, windfall gains in the ﬁrst period tend
to be larger with slow adjustment, and smaller with fast adjustment.
Table 5 summarizes the results. The ﬁrst column labelled ‘Normal’ repeats the results from
28the last column of Table 4 relating to an immediate introduction of reform and a 81% devaluation
of the preexisting stock of tax depreciation claims. If we slow down the transition process by
raising adjustment costs and lengthening the half-life to 10 years (column ‘Slow’), the initial
value of a unit of installed capital must rise more, leading to larger windfall gains. To oﬀset
these wealth eﬀects, the tax depreciable capital stock must be cut even more, by 86 instead
of 81%, to prevent windfall gains. All other results remain almost unchanged. Hence, the real
eﬀects of the proposed transition policy in the short- and the long-run are not sensitive at all to a
variation of adjustment costs, as long as the required one time wealth tax fully oﬀsets the market
induced capital appreciation. As the above arguments suggest, the one time wealth tax in terms
of a 77% cut in the tax depreciable capital stock is signiﬁcantly smaller when accumulation is
fast and the half-life of investment is reduced to about 6 years.
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis
Absolute Changes: ISS Normal Slow Fast
Public debt/GDP ratio 0.676 dG 0.940 0.940 0.941
Additional wage tax 0.000 tL -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
Unemployment rate 0.105 ¯ u 0.091 0.091 0.091
Percentage Changes:
GDP Y 6.926 6.927 6.921
Private Consumption C 3.450 3.452 3.438
Employment, t = 1 LD
1 0.188 0.199 0.194
Tax capital stock, t = 1 ˜ K1 -81.258 -85.803 -76.965
Firm value, t = 1 V1 -0.025 -0.001 -0.001
Legend: (Normal) Half-life of capital accumulation is about 8 years;
(Slow) Half-life 10 years; (Fast) Half-life 6 years.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the short- and long-run consequences of moving to a cash-ﬂow
income tax. A cash-ﬂow tax was advocated by the Meade Report (1978), was part of the Hall
and Rabushka (1995) ﬂat tax proposal and was supported by the U.S. President’s Advisory Panel
on Federal Tax Reform (2006). Transforming the current corporate tax into an S-base cash-ﬂow
29tax is also part of Mitschke’s (2004) tax reform proposal for Germany. This tax is attractive
since it is neutral towards investment and capital structure choices of ﬁrms. In removing the
eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on investment at the ﬁrm level, corresponding to a reduction
of about 13 percentage points of the EMTR, the reform stimulates capital formation, boosts
wages, improves labor market performance leading to signiﬁcantly lower unemployment, and
promises important long-run income gains of around 5 to 8 percentage points, depending on
the speciﬁc implementation scenario. By removing the tax incentive to use external debt, it
should also substantially reduce the debt ratio of the business sector and make ﬁrms ﬁnancially
more robust. However, as with most growth oriented tax reform proposals, the gains mainly
accrue in the long-run and beneﬁt future generations while the transition cost is concentrated
in the short-run and could lead to substantial income losses of present generations. This study
emphasizes that the intergenerational distribution and the level of the income gains depend
importantly on how the resulting losses in corporate tax revenue are ﬁnanced, and what type
of transition strategy is adopted to smooth the revenue losses over time. Since the output gains
from capital accumulation accrue only slowly, the main challenge is to avoid a large burden on
present generations which are, after all, the ones to decide on implementing such a reform.
This paper has studied short-run consequences and alternative transition strategies of im-
plementing an S-base cash-ﬂow tax. Since the capital stock is predetermined, short-run GDP
is driven by labor market performance. The labor market impact can be signiﬁcantly negative
if the losses of corporate tax revenue must be ﬁnanced with higher wage or consumption taxes.
There are three sources of potentially large short-run revenue losses that are, in fact, connected
with the neutrality properties of the reform. First, by initiating an investment boom to start
capital accumulation, the reform leads to large tax allowances in the ﬁrst periods from immedi-
ate investment expensing. Second, because the reform removes tax incentives to use debt, ﬁrms
tend to repay external debt and replace it with new equity. Since new debt is added, but debt
repayment is subtracted from the tax base of an S-base system, this ﬁnancial restructuring leads
to large short-run losses in corporate tax revenue again. Third, if the government, intending to
avoid a one time capital levy from introducing a cash-ﬂow tax, gives temporary tax allowances
to old equity capital, this would further erode tax revenue. Adding up these sources of revenue
losses, the government might either have to raise substantially short-run wage taxes (or VAT)
30which is bad for current labor market performance and GDP, or it might resort to temporary
debt ﬁnancing which shifts the tax burden into the future and reduces the long-run gains. This
illustrates an important trade-oﬀ between short-run costs and long-run gains when moving to
a neutral cash-ﬂow tax which applies more generally to most growth oriented tax reforms. An
alternative would be a gradual introduction of the reform. While this limits short-run rev-
enue losses, it also postpones investment incentives and growth eﬀects of the reform, leading
to a rather prolonged period of lower income, wages and higher unemployment, compared to
instantaneous reform. Gradual implementation is not an attractive transition strategy.
A key issue of any transition policy is how to treat windfall gains or losses on present owners
of the capital stock upon introduction of a new tax system. It is frequently argued that moving
to a cash-ﬂow tax reduces the value of existing capital and puts a one time capital levy on
owners. However, we have argued to the contrary that an instantaneous implementation of the
reform is most likely to lead to windfall gains. The market value of installed capital is likely to
rise when capital accumulation is sticky as postulated by the q-theory of investment and related
empirical literature. In equilibrium, the present value of future returns of a new capital good is
equal to the current acquisition cost plus the additional adjustment costs associated with above
normal investment levels. In the simulation model, which is parameterized in line with empirical
estimates to generate a half-life equal to roughly 8 years, the existence of adjustment costs leads
to signiﬁcant windfall gains. These gains represent a lump-sum redistribution towards current
owners without improving investment incentives. Our preferred transition strategy eliminates
windfall gains on old equity by a one time devaluation of the tax depreciable capital stock of 80%,
leaving only 20% of undepreciated historical investments for further depreciation. Hence, tax
allowances in the early transition phase are signiﬁcantly reduced which erodes the value of capital
to an extent that allows neither windfall gains nor losses. For the same reason, corporate tax
revenue is higher and the need for raising other taxes is reduced. We ﬁnd that the S-base system
can be introduced in a way that avoids short-run costs and yields substantial long-run income
gains of about 7% of GDP. This transition strategy features (i) instantaneous implementation
of the reform, (ii) an 80% devaluation of historic tax depreciation claims, and (iii) use of public
debt to perfectly smooth wage tax rates over time. It turns out that intertemporally balancing
the budget this way requires no change in the wage tax rate.
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The Appendix derives investment and ﬁnancing choices from intertemporal optimization.
Capital Income Taxation: The costs of debt and equity at the ﬁrm level depend on the
structure of personal capital income taxes. Given tax rates tB on interest, tD on dividends and
tG on capital gains, no-arbitrage dictates identical net rates of return on perfectly substitutable
assets. With the residence principle of interest taxation, gross interest rates are equal across
countries, i = i∗, leaving a net interest r =
￿
1 − tB￿
i∗ on internationally tradeable bonds. In
a small country, the world interest i∗ is ﬁxed. If interest on business debt is taxed at the same
rate, no-arbitrage requires a gross rate iB = i∗ which is the cost of debt to ﬁrms. Holding equity
shares yields dividends and capital gains (D and ∇) subject to eﬀective tax rates tD and tG.
Capital gains of old share owners amount to ∇ = Vt+1 − V − V N in total where V is the ﬁrm
value and V N is the value of new share issues (net of share repurchases).10 Again, ﬁrm valuation
must satisfy the no-arbitrage condition






∇, ∇ ≡ Vt+1 − V N − V. (A.1)
Gross income on ﬁrm ownership is D + ∇. To be ﬂexible with respect to the new and old
views of dividend taxation (see Sorensen, 1995, for a review), we distinguish between average
and marginal pay-out ratios. Dividend policy yields an average pay-out ratio ¯ θ, implied by D =
¯ θ(D + ∇). The empirical literature since Lintner (1956) emphasizes that dividends ﬂuctuate
less than total returns. We thus assume that dividends consist of a stable component ¯ D and a
variable part θ(D + ∇) which ﬂuctuates with total income, i.e. D = θ   (D + ∇) + ¯ D. Adding
capital gains ∇ = (1 − θ)(D + ∇)− ¯ D yields total income again. Characterizing dividend policy
by the parameters θ and ¯ D and substituting into (A.1) results in
r   V =
￿
1 − tE￿
(D + ∇) −
￿
tD − tG￿ ¯ D, tE = θtD + (1 − θ)tG, (A.2)
where tE is the marginal eﬀective tax rate on equity returns, consisting of an average of dividends
and capital gains. Dividing by 1 − tE and replacing ∇ gives
￿
1 + iE￿
V = D − ¯ χ − V N + Vt+1, iE =
r
1 − tE, ¯ χ =
tD − tG
1 − tE   ¯ D. (A.3)
10We list the time index only if it refers to a period diﬀerent from the current period t.
32The cost of equity is iE and rises with the eﬀective tax rate tE on equity income at the investor
level. In virtually all tax systems, dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, tD > tG.
Reducing the stable dividend and raising the marginal pay-out ratio θ → ¯ θ thus makes the
eﬀective tax rate on equity depend more on the dividend tax. In line with the ‘old view’,
the dividend tax inﬂates the cost of equity and reduces investment. According to the ‘new
view’, marginal investment is ﬁnanced by retained earnings at the expense of dividends and
yields mainly capital gains. Reducing the marginal pay-out ratio θ makes the eﬀective tax rate
tE depend less on the dividend tax and relatively more on the capital gains tax rate. In the
extreme case, the dividend tax is neutral. The cost of equity and investment incentives thus
depend on the eﬀective capital gains tax rate. In setting θ and ¯ D, we are thus able to ﬂexibly
implement either view on the eﬀect of dividend taxation.
Optimization: Given a return on equity iE as requested by owners, ﬁrms maximize the present
value of dividends net of new share issues (χ = D − ¯ χ−V N in A.3). A ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy is
constrained by the identity D+(I − δK) = π+BN+V N, i.e. dividends and net investment must
be ﬁnanced out of proﬁts, new debt and new share issues. Using the ﬁnancial identity to replace
D yields net dividends χ = π + BN − (I − δK) − ¯ χ. Deﬁning the end of period value function
by V e ≡
￿
1 + iE￿










subject to (1). Noting the deﬁnitions of ˜ Y = F
￿
K,LD￿
−J (I,K)−WD and π in (2) and deﬁning
shadow prices η = dV e/dK, z = dV e/d ˜ K and λ = −dV e/dB yields optimality conditions for

























= 1 − ǫNtK,
(A.4)
and envelope conditions for three stock variables,
K : ηt =
￿
1 − tK￿










˜ K : zt = tK˜ δ +
￿



















Interpretations are standard and discussed in Section 2.1 of the main text. Combining (A.4-A.5)
to eliminate λ yields the optimal capital structure as given in (3).
11See the separate Appendix on hiring decisions in a matching labor market.
33To characterize investment incentives, we derive the user cost of capital in a stationary
equilibrium. Denote the eﬀective tax subsidy to the purchase cost of new capital in (A.4) by











iE + ˜ δ
￿
, (A.6)
where z is the present value of tax depreciation from (A.5). When normalizing adjustment costs
to investment to be zero in a stationary state, JI = JK = 0, the shadow price of capital in
(A.4) becomes η = (1 − Z)
￿
1 + iE￿
. Using this in (A.5) and eliminating m′ by the condition
for optimal capital structure in (3) yields the user cost of capital


















1 − tK   b.
A slight rearrangement results in (4).
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